India’s security relations with China took yet another turn when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Sanya (Hainan province, China) this month. Both countries agreed to set up “a mechanism on coordination on border affairs” and resume defence and military exchanges given up nine months ago when China refused a visa to India’s Northern Army Commander. After the meeting, the Prime Minister stated that defence ties with China would be continued and indicated that the new mechanism on maintaining peace on the border is “work in progress”.
Military exchanges between India and China have been going on ever since Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988 to bring about a thaw after the Wangdung skirmishes in 1986-87 and highly tense relations thereafter. Besides the exchange of visits by senior military officers, the military has been part of the Joint Working Group formed over the boundary question. These exchanges have contributed to military-level confidence-building measures, reducing tension along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and to supplement diplomatic efforts to improve the overall relations between the two countries. Recently, there has also been a joint exercise on counter terrorism.
India and China signed the “Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC Agreement” in 1993. This agreement called for (a) not to pose military threats to each other but to respect and observe the LAC (b) reduce the level of military exercises near the LAC (c) reduce military forces to the minimum level and (d) implement measures given in the agreement by holding meetings and friendly consultations between border personnel and military experts.
In November 1996 India and China signed another agreement on “Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC”. This agreement reaffirmed that neither side will use or threaten to use forces against the other or seek unilateral military superiority. The two sides agreed that along the LAC (a) the number of forces and heavy weapons will be reduced or limited (b) data on the reduction of military forces will be exchanged (c) Military exercise involving more than a division will not be conducted and information about lower-level exercises will be exchanged (d) combat aircraft will not fly within 10 km of the LAC without information to each other (e) troops will exercise self-restraint and avoid escalation if they come into a face-to-face situation, and (f) the regime of scheduled and flag meetings will be expanded and medium and high level contacts between the border authorities will be established step by step.
Two developments created hurdles in the implementation of the above-mentioned agreements. First, despite several meetings at the official and political levels, India and China could not clarify or exchange data on the alignment of the LAC as perceived by respective countries on the maps. As a result, many of the forward-looking steps mentioned in the 1996 agreement could not be implemented. Secondly, the PLA Divisional Commander opposite Ladakh, after accepting the invitation for a meeting with his Indian counterpart, declined to visit Leh and instead asked that the meeting be held in New Delhi. As that would not have served the desired purpose, the meeting was called off.
In the following years, despite policy level flips-flops, ever increasing ground level transgressions into areas claimed by each other and several face-to-face patrol confrontations, military personnel on both sides have exercised self-restraint and have managed to avoid escalation of the situation while guarding the disputed LAC. There have been no firing incidents. It has been possible to maintain peace, if not tranquility, along the LAC. While the credit for this goes to the military on both sides, I would give more credit to our troops who have to remain conscious of the alarming impact of a Chinese intrusion or a skirmish on Indian public opinion.
While the above state in the field can give satisfaction at the tactical level, at the strategic level, however, India is being pushed more and more into a corner. Negotiations between special representatives on the border issue have failed to achieve any breakthrough so far. China has backed out on the agreed principle not to disturb “interests of the settled populations” of the two countries in the border settlement.
In November 2006, in complete disregard of diplomatic norms, the Chinese Ambassador in India publicly voiced China’s claims to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. China has started protesting Indian leaders’ visits to Arunachal Pradesh; denying visas to officials of Arunachal and issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from J & K. It has made considerable logistical improvements and improved its capability to rapidly induct, deploy and sustain large military forces into Tibet. The number of Chinese transgressions in the “disputed areas” has increased. With the deployment of Chinese engineers and soldiers in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, its “all-weather” relations with Pakistan, which in Hu Jintao’s words, are “higher than the mountains and deeper than oceans”, have firmly placed India in a two-front bind in the Western sector. China has also refused to discuss nuclear confidence measures and nuclear risk reduction measures with India on the ground that India is not a NPT recognised nuclear weapon state.
Strategically, China’s competitive relationship with India far outweighs the cooperative one, which allows it to wage a war of nerves from time to time. It continues to exploit our appeasement to its advantage. The Government of India has not been able to counter or reverse this trend.
With the economic interdependence of the two countries rising steadily (trade expected to touch $100 bn in 2015) and the economic agenda being of vital interest, there are many who suggest softening of security relations. But that is not possible so long as the boundary question remains unsettled. An active engagement will indeed be detrimental to both countries either now or in future. In the current geo-political environment, with nuclear symmetry in place, neither China nor India can think of a war; not even a 1962-like limited war. But the unsettled boundary issue and lack of clarity and transparency on the LAC can lead to intrusions or skirmishes in disputed areas which may escalate into a war. India’s armed forces, therefore, have to remain alert and plan for such contingencies till India and China are able to settle the border or find principled ways of living with an unsettled border.
Military exchanges between India and China have been going on ever since Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988 to bring about a thaw after the Wangdung skirmishes in 1986-87 and highly tense relations thereafter. Besides the exchange of visits by senior military officers, the military has been part of the Joint Working Group formed over the boundary question. These exchanges have contributed to military-level confidence-building measures, reducing tension along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and to supplement diplomatic efforts to improve the overall relations between the two countries. Recently, there has also been a joint exercise on counter terrorism.
India and China signed the “Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC Agreement” in 1993. This agreement called for (a) not to pose military threats to each other but to respect and observe the LAC (b) reduce the level of military exercises near the LAC (c) reduce military forces to the minimum level and (d) implement measures given in the agreement by holding meetings and friendly consultations between border personnel and military experts.
In November 1996 India and China signed another agreement on “Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC”. This agreement reaffirmed that neither side will use or threaten to use forces against the other or seek unilateral military superiority. The two sides agreed that along the LAC (a) the number of forces and heavy weapons will be reduced or limited (b) data on the reduction of military forces will be exchanged (c) Military exercise involving more than a division will not be conducted and information about lower-level exercises will be exchanged (d) combat aircraft will not fly within 10 km of the LAC without information to each other (e) troops will exercise self-restraint and avoid escalation if they come into a face-to-face situation, and (f) the regime of scheduled and flag meetings will be expanded and medium and high level contacts between the border authorities will be established step by step.
Two developments created hurdles in the implementation of the above-mentioned agreements. First, despite several meetings at the official and political levels, India and China could not clarify or exchange data on the alignment of the LAC as perceived by respective countries on the maps. As a result, many of the forward-looking steps mentioned in the 1996 agreement could not be implemented. Secondly, the PLA Divisional Commander opposite Ladakh, after accepting the invitation for a meeting with his Indian counterpart, declined to visit Leh and instead asked that the meeting be held in New Delhi. As that would not have served the desired purpose, the meeting was called off.
In the following years, despite policy level flips-flops, ever increasing ground level transgressions into areas claimed by each other and several face-to-face patrol confrontations, military personnel on both sides have exercised self-restraint and have managed to avoid escalation of the situation while guarding the disputed LAC. There have been no firing incidents. It has been possible to maintain peace, if not tranquility, along the LAC. While the credit for this goes to the military on both sides, I would give more credit to our troops who have to remain conscious of the alarming impact of a Chinese intrusion or a skirmish on Indian public opinion.
While the above state in the field can give satisfaction at the tactical level, at the strategic level, however, India is being pushed more and more into a corner. Negotiations between special representatives on the border issue have failed to achieve any breakthrough so far. China has backed out on the agreed principle not to disturb “interests of the settled populations” of the two countries in the border settlement.
In November 2006, in complete disregard of diplomatic norms, the Chinese Ambassador in India publicly voiced China’s claims to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. China has started protesting Indian leaders’ visits to Arunachal Pradesh; denying visas to officials of Arunachal and issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens from J & K. It has made considerable logistical improvements and improved its capability to rapidly induct, deploy and sustain large military forces into Tibet. The number of Chinese transgressions in the “disputed areas” has increased. With the deployment of Chinese engineers and soldiers in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, its “all-weather” relations with Pakistan, which in Hu Jintao’s words, are “higher than the mountains and deeper than oceans”, have firmly placed India in a two-front bind in the Western sector. China has also refused to discuss nuclear confidence measures and nuclear risk reduction measures with India on the ground that India is not a NPT recognised nuclear weapon state.
Strategically, China’s competitive relationship with India far outweighs the cooperative one, which allows it to wage a war of nerves from time to time. It continues to exploit our appeasement to its advantage. The Government of India has not been able to counter or reverse this trend.
With the economic interdependence of the two countries rising steadily (trade expected to touch $100 bn in 2015) and the economic agenda being of vital interest, there are many who suggest softening of security relations. But that is not possible so long as the boundary question remains unsettled. An active engagement will indeed be detrimental to both countries either now or in future. In the current geo-political environment, with nuclear symmetry in place, neither China nor India can think of a war; not even a 1962-like limited war. But the unsettled boundary issue and lack of clarity and transparency on the LAC can lead to intrusions or skirmishes in disputed areas which may escalate into a war. India’s armed forces, therefore, have to remain alert and plan for such contingencies till India and China are able to settle the border or find principled ways of living with an unsettled border.
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