CWG: Lessons in governance

By the time this article appears in print, the CWG will be over. Thankfully so for many Delhiites, who found their lives completely disrupted for almost one month of traffic restrictions and unwarranted city shutdowns. Worse of all, for some reason, the last day of the games was declared a public holiday although the games are being held only in Delhi.

The justification? Security. This is logical. If one could close down the country for some time and declare Sec 144 everywhere, it is certain that incidents of terrorism would be limited.

As logical as closing down a national university and all schools in the capital because the CWG needed their facilities. Last heard, the main demand seems to be for the b US drivers of these schools but most of them have already taken off for their enforced vacation. As the media has already successfully said all that there is to say about the CWG, I will try to see what lessons are to be learnt from the point of view of governance in general.

Lesson 1 - the problem is leadership: Some TV channels seem to have personalised the issue by concentrating on Mr Suresh Kalmadi and what he did or did not do. Even more ludicrous, the focus then shifted to the secretary-general of the CWG, who has been seriously afflicted with a 'foot in the mouth' disease.

Whether it is the organisation of the stadia, choice of volunteers or sale of tickets, it is clear that had the government chosen any random individual to head the organising committee (OC), he or she could not possibly have done a worse job.

But you cannot get leadership and competence out of those who have never demonstrated any organisational abilities. Yet, very little discussion has focused on who, in 2004, thought it fit to hand over the task of organising these games to such incompetent individuals and who should actually be held responsible for the poor performance of Mr Kalmadi and his cohorts.

Lesson 2 - failure of governance: Between the Delhi government , the sports ministry and the OC, it was clear that none was willing to own up responsibility for non-completion of projects. This is like a typical government project where there are so many signatories from different ministries that one cannot say who took the final decision.

But the CWG had to be viewed as an event management exercise which is not in the domain of government competence. As a comparison with the 1982 Asian Games makes clear, the multiplicity of authorities was a major cause of the breakdown in organisation of the CWG.

Lesson 3 - foreign investors' perception will be unaffected:Some media reports seemed to imply that the handling of the games might affect investor perception. This view was also supported by some in the government who felt that it was imperative that the games 'be held at all cost' to maintain India's integrity as an investment destination.

Nothing could be further from the truth. India's success as an investment destination has more to do with growth rates and the recessionary woes of the OECD countries than with the organisational abilities of Mr Kalmadi or the government.

Lesson 4 - the problem is not corruption: The exposure started with revelations from an innocuous Indian gentlemen in London and his links to equally innocuous members of the OC. The media then went to town about the problem of corruption in government contracts.

As young people today would say, 'get a life!'. Look at developed countries like the US or Japan or 'fairly developed' countries like South Korea: kickbacks in high-level government contracts is common to all democracies. They also exist in communist countries, but are not publicly visible.

The real problem with the CWG was the failure to deliver on facilities even after the corruption. But then, what else can one expect when the OC is headed by a politically defunct Congressman. Is he expected to keep other active politicians at bay? Did one seriously expect Mr Kalmadi to have control over thousands of crores of public money?

Lesson 5 - bidding for the Olympic Games: For once, this writer agrees with Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar , but for different reasons. The mandated autonomy of the IOA implies that Mr Kalmadi will again be in charge. Forget other reasons, that will guarantee that the games cannot (and should not) be given to India; so, why waste time over this issue? The bottomline?

The snafus that accompanied the CWG are a classic example of failure of governance. More specifically, a failure of institutions. The IOA is an institutions best viewed as a sinecure for discarded politicians and not one which has any expertise in event management. Till such times as institutions of governance are established in sports management, CWGtype fiascos are bound to recur.

While the obsession with cricket is probably unwarranted, its organisational systems need emulation by other sports bodies.