Learning from Japanese crisis

IT would be a “tragedy of errors”, to use a Shakespearean metaphor, if India’s nuclear power programme — an area of advanced science where India is on the forefront world-wide — is slashed in response to the crisis brought about by nature’s fury in Japan. That would be a big blow to Indian economic development, opening power generation to the ravages of crippling environmental pollution from coal-based thermal plants, and still leave a big void in the target that nuclear power generation was expected to provide — a target of 63,000 MWe during the two decades ahead.

That, of course, does not mean that India and the world can minimise the lessons of the nuclear crisis in Japan, unleashed by a monster tsunami in the wake of a massive earthquake. On the contrary, there are vital and very timely lessons that need to be imbibed by all countries — India certainly — that intend to use nuclear energy for economic advance. But in order to avail of these lessons, an objective, knowledge-based approach is required, not panicky knee-jerk responses.

It has rightly been stated by the Prime Minister in Parliament, and emphasised by top scientists, that the Indian nuclear establishment has all along given primacy to safety parameters — reactor design, double containment construction shielding the reactor vessel, elevating safety features progressively, etc. The result: India’s nuclear power plants have now a passive safety system that shuts down reactor operations automatically even on a single fault. It is also true that the Indian reactors have successfully withstood both the tsunami onslaught in 2004 and the earthquake that devastated Bhuj in Gujarat in 2001. Barring the turbine fire accident at Narora in the first phase of indigenous reactor construction, the Indian reactor operations over three decades have set up a unique safety record.

And yet the nuclear crisis in Japan is a stern warning. All the existing safety parameters have to be re-examined and further strengthened. It must be accepted that Indian nuclear establishment’s safety attainments are not enough. A more stringent approach to all facets of safety of reactor operations is called for. And the lessons from Japan’s nuclear crisis need to be assiduously learnt. Some of these lessons can easily be pin-pointed.

First, the cooling system — the system that failed to perform in the Fukushima reactors, since there was insufficient electricity back-up after the tsunami resulted in botching up electricity availability. The lesson from Japan for India and the world is to insulate the cooling system that has a key role to perform once the reactor shuts down in an exigency. The Indian nuclear establishment has notable attainments of indigenous technology in building coolant channels. They have to extend R & D in this area in order to insulate the cooling system from all possible natural disasters, just as much as operational hick-ups.

Second, the Fukushima site was particularly vulnerable, being in the most dangerous seismic zone. Even if this may not be applicable to India, the site selection committee must apply more stringent criteria for all future nuclear projects. Gujarat’s Kakrapar reactors have been rated (in 1998) among the best in the world. But notwithstanding the fact that they withstood the ravages of the Bhuj earthquake of 2001, future reactor sites must avoid earthquake-prone locations. Another criterion should be to avoid the east coastal zones despite Kalpakkam reactors having withstood the tsunami depredation in 2004. Experience has shown that it is the east coast areas that tsunamis have done the maximum damage.

Third, reactor design selection is of key importance in the safety parameters. The safety features have been progressively enhanced in modern reactor designs. The Indian indigenous PHWR reactors have enhanced safety features. Yet there should be no complacency; the Indian nuclear establishment needs to upgrade safety features of the new 700 MW PHWRs whose construction is being undertaken. Possibly, the Indo-Canadian nuclear cooperation agreement inked recently may enable joint research to this end.

It is equally important that in the selection of reactor designs of imported light water reactors, a very high degree of technological perfection is sought. These reactor designs have to be of proven record, and nothing but the best has to be accepted.

Our sympathies with the Japanese people notwithstanding, it should be accepted that the Japanese nuclear authorities of the Tokyo Electricity utility have been complacent, if not callous, in this regard. The Fukushima reactors were based on 1972 vintage GE boiling water reactor design, and their lifespan was fully exhausted. And yet, early this year before the devastating earthquake struck Japan, the Fukushima reactors’ life-span was extended by another 12 years. And this without any technological upgrading, ignoring the extreme vulnerability of the seismic zone in which these reactors were located, thereby displaying the grip of commercial motives that pervade the Tokyo Electricity utility.

We note that Tarapur 1 and 2 reactors are of a similar GE boiling water design, and of even older vintage. But it must be said to the credit of the Indian nuclear establishment that technological upgrading has all along been injected into the GE design and the consequence is the success story that we have at Tarapur. In fact, Tarapur 1 and 2 reactors are not what the GE left behind and, with American sanctions imposed on Indian nuclear facilities for 30 years, it was Indian nuclear capability alone that kept these reactors functioning so well. However, even Tarapur 1 and 2 have long completed their life-span, and have been given a second five-year extension. For how long? The NPCIL must determine the life-span of these reactors, keeping stringent safety audit in view.

Fourth, and perhaps the most important factor in the quest for safety, is the need to elevate the status and capability of the Nuclear Regulatory Board. As of now, the AERB is subservient to the AEC whose operations it is supposed to watch — with vigilance and a critical eye. Even though the AERB is an adjunct of the AEC, its status as a watchdog needs to be upgraded. The Indian nuclear regulatory body should function somewhat like its counterparts in France and the United States: equivalent in status to the Atomic Energy Commission. The second requisite for the nuclear watchdog to effectively safeguard nuclear operations from transgression is to add to its knowledge pool by close linkage with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

All said and done, it needs to be recognised that extracting energy by splitting the atom is a knowledge-based technology, which requires constant upgrading. It has both plus and minus points. Radiation is a hazard if allowed to spin out of control. Its strong counter-balancing plus points are: (a) that nuclear energy is perhaps the only large-scale energy source that can fill the void of fast depleting fossil fuels, already being priced out, threatening inflation and the fabric of the economy; (b) it is the only non-pollutant alternative to fossil fuels that threaten catastrophic climate change, posing the biggest challenge to mankind.

It is for these reasons that nuclear energy has become a critical requirement of India’s growth plans. The fact is that India’s growth projections and the corresponding energy needs are unsustainable without large tapping of nuclear energy. The target of 63,000 MWe of nuclear energy capacity by the year 2032 as visualised in the Integrated Energy Policy takes these factors into account. It is a tough goal, but the attainments of India’s nuclear establishment are paving the way for realising this goal.