As External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna joins the special summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — which is celebrating the tenth anniversary of its founding on Wednesday in Astana in Kazakhstan — there is much hyperbole about the geopolitical transformation of Eurasia.
For the orphans of the Cold War, the SCO — led by China and Russia and including four Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — represents either their darkest fears or fondest hopes.
For some in Europe and North America, the SCO is “anti-West” and “anti-NATO” and is readying to establish hegemony on the Asian landmass. For some outside the West, the SCO — which has India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia as observers — is the dream alliance that Asia failed to organise during the Cold War but could be turned into a reality now.
For traditional geopolitical theorists, rising China has the potential to unite the heartland of Eurasia, end the centuries-old regional dominance by the Western maritime powers and make itself the pre-eminent nation in the world.
Much of this hype is rooted in the growing worldwide perception of an inevitable American decline and a relentless rise of China. The SCO summit also takes place amidst the US plans to downsize its military presence in Afghanistan starting next month and end its combat role there by 2014.
The SCO summit is expected to consider Kabul’s application to be admitted as an observer. Until now, Afghanistan has been attending the SCO deliberations as a guest. At the Astana summit, the SCO is also expected to open the door for full membership of India and Pakistan.
Some SCO enthusiasts suggest that Delhi will soon have to make a geopolitical choice — between the continental Sino-Russian entente that beckons it from the north and the Asian maritime coalition led by the United States tempting it from the south.
Amid the US retreat, the continentalists argue, India might be isolated in Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond, if it does not line up behind China and Russia.
This is similar to the advice that Pakistan has reportedly offered Afghanistan — dump Washington, align with Beijing; forget NATO and look to SCO. But Beijing has reportedly cautioned Pakistani leaders against geopolitcal delusion and focus on mending fences with the US as well as its immediate neighbours, including India and Afghanistan.
As it rises in the international system, India is under no pressure to make immediate judgments on the shifting balance of power between a rising China and a troubled United States, let alone choose between the “crouching tiger” and the “crippled eagle”. Like everyone else, India would hedge rather than tightly align with one or the other great power groupings.
In any event, the coherence of the SCO and its anti-Western orientation are somewhat exaggerated. China and Russia, which form the dual core of the SCO, are not always on the same page in defining the strategic priorities of the organisation. Moscow cannot but be wary of the rising Chinese influence in Central Asian space that was once part of the Soviet Union.
China and Russia might be interested in leveraging the SCO to improve their bargaining power with the United States, but the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have no problem seeing through this. Some of the CARs have been pretty good at extracting concessions from America in return for hosting US military bases and facilities.
The Obama administration itself has taken a positive view of the SCO and on a recent visit to China, US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, Robert Blake, has called for a comprehensive dialogue between Washington and the SCO.
The US has indeed worked with Russia in developing the Northern Distribution Network, a road network in Eurasia, as an alternative to its current reliance on Pakistan for supplying international troops in Afghanistan. Washington has also urged China to take on a larger responsibility for stabilising Afghanistan.
From a pragmatic perspective, the SCO is a useful vehicle for India in the pursuit of three important national security objectives. The first is about managing the post-American scenario in Afghanistan.
While the US has the luxury of withdrawing from Afghanistan, Russia, the CARs, China and India remain vulnerable if negative forces fill the vacuum in Afghanistan.
All neighbours of Afghanistan, barring Turkmenistan, are part of the SCO in one form or another. The SCO, then, could provide the regional framework that everyone now wants for the stabilisation of Afghanistan.
The second is about fighting what China calls the “three evils” — separatism, religious extremism and terrorism. While China and India have long faced similar threats, Beijing has seemed reluctant to engage Delhi on these issues for fear of offending Islamabad’s sensitivities. As the situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate, India must explore the prospects of deeper regional security cooperation with China within the SCO framework.
The third is the SCO’s utility in promoting economic integration between Central Asia and India. The SCO’s focus in its first decade has been primarily on counter-terrorism. At Astana, it could widen the agenda to include economic integration.
Until now Delhi could not entice Pakistan to become the bridge between India on the one hand and Afghanistan and Central Asia on the other. Could the SCO do the trick?
If the size of the Indian market provides the necessary economic pull, the SCO could provide the necessary political push in encouraging Pakistan to open its territory for Central Asian connectivity with India.
An early agreement to build the TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) natural gas pipeline, with the full participation of Russian and Chinese companies, could be the precursor for such an integration.
The SCO may or may not achieve the many ambitious regional objectives it is setting for itself. But Krishna has every reason to arrive in Astana to push for a stronger partnership with the SCO.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi
For the orphans of the Cold War, the SCO — led by China and Russia and including four Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — represents either their darkest fears or fondest hopes.
For some in Europe and North America, the SCO is “anti-West” and “anti-NATO” and is readying to establish hegemony on the Asian landmass. For some outside the West, the SCO — which has India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia as observers — is the dream alliance that Asia failed to organise during the Cold War but could be turned into a reality now.
For traditional geopolitical theorists, rising China has the potential to unite the heartland of Eurasia, end the centuries-old regional dominance by the Western maritime powers and make itself the pre-eminent nation in the world.
Much of this hype is rooted in the growing worldwide perception of an inevitable American decline and a relentless rise of China. The SCO summit also takes place amidst the US plans to downsize its military presence in Afghanistan starting next month and end its combat role there by 2014.
The SCO summit is expected to consider Kabul’s application to be admitted as an observer. Until now, Afghanistan has been attending the SCO deliberations as a guest. At the Astana summit, the SCO is also expected to open the door for full membership of India and Pakistan.
Some SCO enthusiasts suggest that Delhi will soon have to make a geopolitical choice — between the continental Sino-Russian entente that beckons it from the north and the Asian maritime coalition led by the United States tempting it from the south.
Amid the US retreat, the continentalists argue, India might be isolated in Afghanistan, Central Asia and beyond, if it does not line up behind China and Russia.
This is similar to the advice that Pakistan has reportedly offered Afghanistan — dump Washington, align with Beijing; forget NATO and look to SCO. But Beijing has reportedly cautioned Pakistani leaders against geopolitcal delusion and focus on mending fences with the US as well as its immediate neighbours, including India and Afghanistan.
As it rises in the international system, India is under no pressure to make immediate judgments on the shifting balance of power between a rising China and a troubled United States, let alone choose between the “crouching tiger” and the “crippled eagle”. Like everyone else, India would hedge rather than tightly align with one or the other great power groupings.
In any event, the coherence of the SCO and its anti-Western orientation are somewhat exaggerated. China and Russia, which form the dual core of the SCO, are not always on the same page in defining the strategic priorities of the organisation. Moscow cannot but be wary of the rising Chinese influence in Central Asian space that was once part of the Soviet Union.
China and Russia might be interested in leveraging the SCO to improve their bargaining power with the United States, but the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have no problem seeing through this. Some of the CARs have been pretty good at extracting concessions from America in return for hosting US military bases and facilities.
The Obama administration itself has taken a positive view of the SCO and on a recent visit to China, US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, Robert Blake, has called for a comprehensive dialogue between Washington and the SCO.
The US has indeed worked with Russia in developing the Northern Distribution Network, a road network in Eurasia, as an alternative to its current reliance on Pakistan for supplying international troops in Afghanistan. Washington has also urged China to take on a larger responsibility for stabilising Afghanistan.
From a pragmatic perspective, the SCO is a useful vehicle for India in the pursuit of three important national security objectives. The first is about managing the post-American scenario in Afghanistan.
While the US has the luxury of withdrawing from Afghanistan, Russia, the CARs, China and India remain vulnerable if negative forces fill the vacuum in Afghanistan.
All neighbours of Afghanistan, barring Turkmenistan, are part of the SCO in one form or another. The SCO, then, could provide the regional framework that everyone now wants for the stabilisation of Afghanistan.
The second is about fighting what China calls the “three evils” — separatism, religious extremism and terrorism. While China and India have long faced similar threats, Beijing has seemed reluctant to engage Delhi on these issues for fear of offending Islamabad’s sensitivities. As the situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate, India must explore the prospects of deeper regional security cooperation with China within the SCO framework.
The third is the SCO’s utility in promoting economic integration between Central Asia and India. The SCO’s focus in its first decade has been primarily on counter-terrorism. At Astana, it could widen the agenda to include economic integration.
Until now Delhi could not entice Pakistan to become the bridge between India on the one hand and Afghanistan and Central Asia on the other. Could the SCO do the trick?
If the size of the Indian market provides the necessary economic pull, the SCO could provide the necessary political push in encouraging Pakistan to open its territory for Central Asian connectivity with India.
An early agreement to build the TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) natural gas pipeline, with the full participation of Russian and Chinese companies, could be the precursor for such an integration.
The SCO may or may not achieve the many ambitious regional objectives it is setting for itself. But Krishna has every reason to arrive in Astana to push for a stronger partnership with the SCO.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi
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